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1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of 1997 Asian financial crisis, there was much controversy among 
economists about its origin and nature. A decade later, economists have learned much about 
the relation between financial and exchange crises even the underlying dynamics before and 
after the crises are not enough discussed. 
Two generations of currency crisis models have been developed before the 1997 Asian 
turmoil and are pertinent in explaining other particular crisis in the 1990s. The first focused 
on budgetary deficits and the effect of its continuing monetary financing (Krugman, 1979; 
Flood and Garber, 1984). The second (Obstfeld, 1994; Sachs et al., 1996), explained the crisis 
as the result of a conflict between a nominal exchange rate peg and the desire of pursuing an 
expansionary monetary policy, leading to the existence of multiple equilibria.  
In the major crisis countries of Asia, however, neither of these stories has much relevance. 
In terms of conventional fiscal measures, the governments of the distressed economies were 
in quite good shape at the beginning of 1997. While growth had slowed and some signs of 
excess capacity appeared in 1996, none of them faced the kind of clear trade-off between 
employment and exchange rate stability.  
The third-generation models of currency crisis were then developed to answer the 
particular questions raised during the Asian crisis. Many of these models have in common the 
idea that the crisis should be seen as a result of a shock that is amplified by what Bernanke et 
al. (1999) have called a financial accelerator mechanism. The basic story is similar: Since 
firms’ assets and liabilities are denominated in domestic and foreign currency respectively, 
real currency depreciation can have a large effect on output if it affects the credit access of 
some subset of agents; moreover this effect on output may in turn affect the exchange rate, 
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further amplifying the shock and causing it to persist. Most have argued that the core of the 
problem lies in the banking system (Corsetti et al., 1999; Chang and Velasco, 2001).  
For Krugman (1999), any useful model of the crisis must involve some mechanism that 
produces multiple equilibria. He has remarked that the transfer problem, debated by Keynes 
and Ohlin in the 1920s, was central to what has happened to Asia. This issue has been 
remarkably absent from many formal models perhaps because the modellers have been 
mainly concerned with the behaviour of investors in one-good models rather than with the 
real economy per se. Hence, they don’t pay much attention to the movement in the terms of 
trade (or the real exchange rate) and the reversal in the current account. In practice, this 
reversal has been achieved partly through massive real depreciation, partly though severe 
recession that produces a compression of imports.  
Using a model with balance-sheet effect, Krugman (1999) has sketched the transfer 
problem as another way of explaining the Asian crisis: foreign currency debts and firms’ 
leveraged financing make the domestic economy fragile and prone to crisis. He provides then 
a static analysis of his model and has found that there are three equilibria with the crisis 
brought on by a pure shift in expectations, leading to possible jump from high investment 
equilibrium to one with zero investment. A large literature of financial crisis that focuses on 
the story of balance-sheet effects and leverage constraint similar to Krugman (1999) has been 
developed into different directions (Allen et al., 2002). For example, Mendoza (2002) has 
shown that a mismatch between the denomination of debt and income exacerbates financial 
crises in emerging markets. Aghion et al. (2001, 2004a, b) have integrated the credit side with 
monetary side in order to study explicitly the problem of exchange rate stabilisation and 
provide optimal monetary policy prescriptions when a crisis occurs. Schneider and Tornell 
(2004) have developed a model based on sectoral asymmetries in corporate finance with 
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currency mismatch and borrowing constraints arising endogenously, giving rise to self-
fulfilling crises.  
Empirically, Upadhyaya and Upadhyaya (1999) have found that, with few exceptions, 
currency devaluation in Asian countries fails to make any effect on output over any length of 
time - short run, intermediate run, or long run. Kim and Ying (2007), using the pre-1997 crisis 
data and the trade-weighted exchange rate, have observed no evidence of contractionary 
devaluations. In fact, currency devaluation appears strongly expansionary in several countries. 
But their exercise suggests also that the crisis period was indeed different. However, after 
currency devaluation, the level of GDP can remain permanently below its initial trend, 
suggesting that the shocks underlying a currency crisis are persistent (Hong and Tornell, 
2005).1 Taking a long term view and considering a great number of countries borrowing in 
foreign currencies, Bordo et al. (2010) has shown empirically that financial crises, driven by 
exposure to foreign currency, resulted in significant permanent output losses. 
The theoretical advances in the literature of international financial crisis, achieved after 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, have also great pertinence for understanding the repercussions 
of subprime crisis on Central and Eastern European countries and Iceland (Krugman (2010)). 
In effect, many of these countries have large amount of foreign debt denominated in foreign 
currencies (see, for example, Sirtaine and Skamnelos (2007), Von Hagen and Siedschlag 
(2008), Buiter and Sibert (2009), Stokes (2009) and Danielsson (2009) among others) and 
they are vulnerable to a devaluation or depreciation of national currency, exactly as in 1997 
Asian financial crisis. It is astonishing that the great lessons of the 1997 Asian crisis are not 
learned.2  
                                                 
1 This can also be explained by the shift, induced by violent shocks, in the behaviours of international lenders as 
well as that of domestic firms, leading to less lending (or borrowing) and hence less investment and lower 
growth rate of the GDP. 
2 A debate emerged in the late 1990s regarding the causes of the prevalence of foreign currency denominated 
foreign debt in emerging markets. Some saw it as a consequence of moral hazard. Hausmann (1999), and 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) advanced the “original sin hypothesis” to describe a situation where “the 
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In this context, it is particularly interesting to revisit Krugman’s (1999) article which is 
distinguished by its profound insight within a simple framework and its capability of dealing 
with a large number of issues on currency and foreign debt crisis. It is among the early articles 
to draw the attention of economists on issues of debt composition and particularly currency 
denomination. It has a large impact on the literature on the currency and debt crisis and is 
largely used in graduate teachings.3 However, while the model of Krugman (1999) is 
dynamic, there are no ulterior extensions investigating the dynamic implications of this 
model. The central objective of this paper is to fill the gap and to supply a graphical analysis 
of the dynamics of Krugman’s (1999) model by introducing some supplementary assumptions 
and equations, notably equations of wealth accumulation and external equilibrium condition. 
This allows us to see from a different angle the mechanism of financial crisis in the model 
initially developed by Krugman for Asian emerging market countries exposed to foreign 
currency debt.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the 
dynamic model. In the section after, we describe the steady state. In section 4, we examine the 
dynamic properties of the model and the mechanism of financial crisis. In section 5, we 
discuss factors at the origin of financial fragility and crisis. The section 6 gives an analysis of 
policy implications. The last section concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
domestic currency is not used to borrow abroad or to borrow long-term even domestically”. Eichengreen, 
Hausmann and Panizza (2005a, b) have argued that it was not a mere consequence of bad policies or institutions. 
3 For example, Krugman’s model (1999) is included in a number of books such as Gandolfo (2002), Isard et al. 
(2000), Allen (2004), etc… The article of Krugman (1999) is also on the reading lists of some leading Master’s 
programs across the world, e.g, “Open economy macroeconomics (Summer 2004)” by Charles Wyplosz at 
Graduate Institute of International study, Geneva, Switzland; “International Economics II (Fall 2006)” by 
Ricardo Caballero, and Guido Lorenzoni at MIT, USA; “Advanced Macroeconomics for the Open Economy 
(Fall 2009)” by Jeffrey A. Frankel, at Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; “Financial crises, 
bubbles and crashes (BMSS 2008)” by Hans-Joachim Voth  at Barcelona Macroeconomics Summer School, 
Spain; “Internaitonal macroeconomics (fall 2008)” by Giancarlo Corsetti and Philippe Martin at Sciences-Po, 
Ecole Polytechnique, ENSAE, France; “International Macroeconomics (February, 2010)” by Patrick Pintus in 
the Master Program in Economics and Finance at Université de la Méditerranée & GREQAM-IDEP, France. 
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2. The model 
 
We extend the small open-economy model of Krugman (1999), which does not include the 
money, to a multi-period model. The model is described by the following equations:  
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XpyIXpCIy ttttttt +)−)(1−(1+ )−(1=+)−(1+ )−(1= μαμμμ   ,    (2) 
X
Iyp ttt
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with ty  denotes the output, tK  the stock of physical capital, tL  the labour, tI  the investment, 
tC  the consumption, tp  the real exchange rate (or the relative price of foreign goods), tX  the 
exportations, tW  the net wealth of domestic entrepreneurs, tD  the domestic currency 
denominated debt, tF  the foreign currency denominated debt, tr  the domestic real interest 
rate and *tr  the foreign real interest rate. Among these variables, ty , tK , tI , tC , tW  and tD  
are measured in terms of domestic goods, and tX  and tF , are in terms of foreign goods.  
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Equation (1) represents the production function, assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, of the 
small open economy that produces a single good each period using capital and labour. Capital 
is created through investment and it is assumed that it lasts only one period, so that this 
period’s capital is equal to last period’s investment. This assumption allows putting aside 
Diamond-Dybvig-type concerns over maturity mismatch between capital and foreign debt.  
Equation (2) describes the market clearing condition for domestic goods. The functions of 
demand for consumption and investment are derived under the simple assumption that the 
residents of this economy are divided into two distinct classes. Workers, who receive a share 
α−1  of domestic income, lack access to the capital market and therefore spend all their 
income within each period. Entrepreneurs, who are assumed to be single-mindedly engaged in 
wealth accumulation, saving and investing all their income, create and own domestic capital 
until they have exhausted domestic investment opportunities. After that, they will spend the 
surplus of their revenue over investment.4 The domestic and foreign goods, with a unitary 
elasticity of substitution, are not perfect substitutes. A share μ−1  of both consumption and 
investment is spent on domestic goods, μ  on imports. The rest of the world is large and 
spends a negligible fraction of its income on domestic goods. The value of domestic exports 
in terms of foreign goods is assumed to be fixed with XXt = , i.e. the foreign elasticity of 
substitution is also unitary. 
From equation (2), the domestic real exchange rate is expressed as in equation (3). 
According to (3), the higher is the investment, the lower the real exchange rate.  
Inequality (4) specifies that the ability of domestic entrepreneurs to invest is limited by 
their wealth in the way of Bernanke et al. (1999). Lenders impose a limit on leverage, 
                                                 
4 We introduce this assumption to close the small open-economy model. Otherwise, these entrepreneurs can 
accumulate an infinite amount of wealth. This assumption might not be plausible one for describing some 
emerging economies having sufficiently accumulated capital. As illustrated by recent international developments 
of South Korean firms, ambitious and innovative entrepreneurs might be tempted to invest on international 
financial market and in industrial projects in other countries. For other manners of closing the model, see 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). 
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justified by motives such as risk of insolvability and asymmetric information. Hence, 
entrepreneurs can borrow at most )1( λ+ times their initial wealth.  
Equation (5) shows that the return of domestic investment is determined by the marginal 
productivity of capital. Because a share μ  of investment falls on foreign goods, the price 
index for investment relative to that of domestic output is μ−tp . Hence, ),( ttk LKG  is not the 
return on savings denominated in domestic goods. One unit of domestic good saved in t 
produces μ−tp  units of capital and therefore the return on domestic bonds (by arbitrage) 
should be equal to αμαμμααμ αα −−−−−−−−− == tttttttkt pIppILKGp 11)1(11),( . 
According to inequality (6), entrepreneurs will not borrow beyond the point at which the 
real return on domestic investment, determined by equation (5), equals that on foreign 
investment. It is similar to uncovered interest rates parity (UIRP), which compares the return 
that can be achieved with domestic capital (by converting a unity of foreign goods into 
domestic goods at the real exchange rate tp , then converting the next-period return back into 
foreign goods at 1+tp ) and the rate of return of foreign asset 
*
tr .   
Equation (7) imposes that investment cannot be negative.  
Entrepreneurs own a wealth which is defined by equation (8). They hold all domestic 
capital and receive a share α  of domestic revenue that will not be spent for consumption. The 
income accruing to capital within the current period ( tyα ) also represents the value of 
domestic capital since it lasts only one period. At aggregate level, they owe debt to 
international lenders with the “currency composition” of debt taken as given. 
Equation (9) describes the evolution of foreign debt contracted by domestic entrepreneurs. 
All investment not financed by their wealth is financed by foreign debt. In other words, it 
represents the balance-sheet constraint of these entrepreneurs. 
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Equation (10) represents the external equilibrium condition or balance of payments. Under 
flexible exchange rate regime where the balance of payments exhibits neither deficit nor 
surplus, i.e. 0=eeB , equation (10) is equivalent to the combination of (2), (8) and (9).  
Equations (9) and (10) represent the logic extension of Krugman’s model. They are 
important to our understanding of the underlying dynamic features of a crisis prone economy.  
In the following, we assume for simplicity that the flexibility on the labour market will 
ensure full employment and the supply of labour is normalized to unity so that t ,1 ∀=tL .  
Assume that entrepreneurs risk neutral and maximise their firms’ benefits in period t. 
Therefore, if ttt rpI +≥−−− 111 αμαα , i.e. the marginal revenue is higher than (or equal to) the 
marginal cost of investment, the leverage constraint (4) is binding, i.e.:  
tttt prrp )1()1(
*
1 +=++ .       (11) 
In other words, when the marginal rate of return of domestic investment is higher than the 
cost of financing additional investment, entrepreneurs find it advantageous to borrow from 
abroad the maximal amount allowed by the leverage constraint. If ttt rpI +<−−− 111 αμαα , the 
constraint (4) will not be binding and entrepreneurs will borrow less than that is authorised by 
the leverage multiplier. 
The ratio of foreign currency (or goods) denominated debt relative to domestic currency 
denominated debt is assumed to be ν :  
ν==
−
−
1
1
t
t
t
t
D
F
D
F .                                            (12) 
The ratio ν  can be modified arbitrarily to examine the effect of its variation on economic 
equilibrium. In the following, tD  is simply named “foreign debt” even though the “total 
foreign debt” is a multiple of it, i.e. ttttt DvpFpD )1( +=+ . 
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Foreign banks would pay attention to the wealth left to entrepreneur after the payment of 
principal and interests. If this financial indicator is zero or negative, no bank will lend to these 
entrepreneurs. Using equations (1), (8), (11) and (12), we obtain:  
1
*
1
1
1 )1( −−
−
−
− +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−= ttt
t
t
ttt Drvpp
ppIW μα .             (13) 
If 0<tW , international lenders will lose money while reducing their lending to zero. All 
entrepreneurs will bankrupt and invest zero, i.e. the constraint (7) will be binding.  
We define an iso-wealth curve representing the combinations of foreign debt and 
investment that ensure a constant wealth. For a given wealth 0W , equation (13) can be 
rewritten as: 
)1()1( * 11
0111
1
−−
−
−
−−− ++
−=
ttt
tttt
t rpvp
WpppID
μα .               (14) 
For given 0W , 1−tp  and tp , there is a positive relation between investment and foreign debt 
as shown in Fig. 1.  
A given combination of investment and foreign debt ( 0I , 0D ) can correspond to different 
levels of entrepreneurs’ wealth, depending on the values of exogenous variables and 
parameters such as *tr , X, μ  and α .  
                           I                                                     Iso-wealth bis ( '0W ) 
                 
                                                               Iso-wealth ( 0W )  
                                                             
                         0I                               C 
                                                                                           
                                                                                    
    
   
                                        
    O                              0D                       D 
         Fig. 1: Iso-wealth curve.  
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We notice that a variation of λ  has no effect on the iso-wealth curve. According to 
equation (14), the curve Iso-wealth will rotate counter-clockwise around C to a position like 
the curve Iso-wealth bis corresponding to lower net wealth, '0W  (see Fig. 1), if there is:  
- an increase in *tr  that reduces entrepreneurs’ wealth.  
- a decrease in X, since this implies according to equation (3) a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate, decreasing the current value of domestic product but increasing the 
value of principal and interests on foreign debt.  
- an increase in μ  that, in increasing demand for foreign goods, implies a depreciation 
of the real exchange rate and hence has similar effect as a decrease in X. 
However, an increase in α  has ambiguous effects on entrepreneurs’ wealth. It implies, on 
the one hand, an increased revenue accrued to capitalists, and on the other hand, a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate (due to higher productivity of existing capital and hence 
higher output, and higher part of revenue that is exported) which increases thus the value of 
foreign debt when measured in domestic currency. 
The model has nine endogenous variables, i.e. ty , tC , tI , tK , tr , tp , tW , tD  and tF . It 
can be resolved in two steps. The first step consists to solve the reduced system of difference 
equations describing the evolution of tp , tI   and tD . In the second step, we can solve for tF , 
tK , ty , tC , tr  and tW  given the solutions of tp , tI   and tD .  
Substituting ty  defined by equation (1) into equation (3) yields: 
X
IpIp tttt
)1()]1)(1(1[1 μμααμα −−−−−=
−
− .       (15) 
Using equations (1), (8), (11) and (12) to eliminate tF , tW and tr  leads to the difference 
equation of tI  which verifies the condition ttt rpI +≥−− 11 αμαα : 
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1
*
1
1
1
1 )1(
1)1()1( −−
−
−−− +++−+= ttt
t
t
ttt Drpp
vppII λαλ αμα .      (16) 
The dynamics of private foreign debt, which is equal to the country’s external debt in the 
present model, can be described equivalently by equation (9) or equation (10) with 0=eeB . 
Using equation (9) and eliminating tF , tW and tr  as before lead to:  
1
*
1
1
1
1 )1(
1)1( −−
−
−−− +++−=+ ttt
t
t
ttttt Drpp
vppIIvpD αμαα .    (17) 
Equations (15) and (16)-(17) allow describing the dynamic behaviours of real exchange 
rate, investment and foreign debt. They are non-linear difference equations and cannot be 
solved explicitly. However, the static and dynamic properties of this reduced system can be 
studied with the help of phase diagram. 
 
3. Steady state 
 
The steady state equilibrium is attained when the dynamic effects of shocks are fully 
exercised, i.e. pppp ttt === −+ 11 , III tt ==−1 , DDD tt == −1  and 1* 1* −− ==== tttt rrrrr . 
Using the condition rpI tt +≥−− 11 αμαα , we obtain that the steady state level of investment must 
satisfy the following condition:  
}1{argˆ *1 rpIII +==≤ −− αμαα .      (18) 
For given international interest rate, the highest level of investment, Iˆ , that is rational to 
realise at the steady state, corresponds to the one that equalizes the marginal productivity of 
capital and the financial opportunity cost of investing.  
The steady state counterparts of equations (15), (16) and (17) are given as follows: 
X
II
p
)1()]1)(1(1[ μμαα −−−−−= ,                             (19) 
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DrpvpII )1)(1)(1()1( *+++−+= − λαλ αμα ,       (20) 
DrpvIpI *)1( +=−−αμαα ,            (21) 
The steady state equilibrium of the reduced dynamic system is defined by the vector ( I , 
p , D ) which checks simultaneously equations (18)-(21). To ensure a positive real exchange 
rate, we impose that 0)1()]1)(1(1[ >−−−−− II μμαα . 
Given the steady state level of investment, equation (19) determines the steady state real 
exchange rate. Equation (20) corresponds to the combination of investment and foreign debt 
along the most rapid wealth-accumulation path, limited by condition (18). Equation (21) is the 
solvency constraint of entrepreneurs, which implies that the surplus of wealth over investment 
is equal to interest payments on foreign debt. Equation (21) can be substituted by the steady 
state counterpart of equation (10) meaning that, in the absence of entry and exit of capital, the 
trade surplus must be equal to interest payments on foreign debt. Since the debt in this model 
is only foreign and uniquely contracted by entrepreneurs, their solvency constraint is then 
identical to the external solvency constraint of the economy.  
The system constituted of equations (19)-(21) can be decomposed into two sub-systems 
that can be separately solved. Substituting p given by equation (19) into equations (20)-(21) 
and rearranging the terms lead to 
)1(})1()]1)(1(1[{)1(
})1()]1)(1(1[{)1(
*
1
rIvIvX
IXIIXID
inv +−−−−−++
−−−−−−+=
−+
μμαλ
μμαλα
α
αμααμα
,  (22) 
*
1
})1()]1)(1(1[{
})1()]1)(1(1[{
rIvIvX
IXIIXID
ee μμα
μμα
α
αμααμα
−−−−−+
−−−−−−=
−+
,          (23) 
where 
inv
D  and 
ee
D denote, for all levels of investment, the highest steady state debt 
compatible with the leverage constraint and the external solvency constraint respectively. 
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Equations (22)-(23) constitute a sub-system incorporating the effects of the real exchange rate 
on wealth and can be solved to obtain I  and D  taking account of condition (18). 
For each value of 
inv
D , we can determine a “financeable” level of investment that would 
occur if the leverage constraint (4) was binding. It determines, taking account of the effect of 
investment on the real exchange rate, and hence on balance sheets, how much credit could be 
extended to domestic firms at maximum. Since risk-neutral entrepreneurs use maximally the 
leveraged financing, equation (22) represents also the set of combinations of foreign debt and 
optimal investment for all II ˆ< .  
According to equation (22), 
inv
D  is positive for [
~
,0] II ∈  and it equals zero for 0=I  and 
II
~= , with: 
 }1})1()]1)(1(1[{)1({arg
~ 1 =−−−−−+= −− αμααμα μμαλα IIXII .   (24) 
Equation (23) implies that 
ee
D  is positive for [,0] dII ∈  with 
}1})1()]1)(1(1[{{arg 1 =−−−−−= −− αμααμα μμα IIXIId  and it equals zero for 0=I  and 
dII = .  
The relative position of 
inv
D  and 
ee
D  at the steady state is examined through their 
difference:  
)1(})1()]1)(1(1[{)1(
})1()]1)(1(1[{)1]()1(1[)1(
**
1**
rrIvIvX
IIXIrIXrDD
eeinv +−−−−−++
−−−−−+−+−++=−
−+
μμαλ
μμαλαλλ
α
αμααμα
.  (25) 
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As the denominator at the right hand of equation (25) is positive, it is straightforward to show 
that 0=−
eeinv
DD  has two solutions. The first solution is zero and the second solution 
denoted by idI
~
 is positive with:5 
{ }*1* 1})1()]1)(1(1[{)1]()1(1[arg~ rIIXIrIid λλμμαλα αμααμα ++=−−−−−+−+= −− .  
Thus, we have: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<<
≥≥−
id
id
eeinv II
IIDD ~
 if ,0
~
 if ,0 .       (26) 
According to (26), for idII
~<  (respectively idII
~≥ ), the level of foreign debt compatible 
with external equilibrium is higher than (respectively equal to or lower than) the maximal 
foreign debt allowed by the leverage constraint. Rewrite Iˆ  and  idI
~
 given by (18) and (24) as 
}{argˆ
*11
α
αμα rpII +−− ==  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ == +−+ ++
−−
)1]()1(1[
11
*
*
arg
~
λα
λλαμα
r
r
id pII  respectively. Since 
)1]()1(1[
11
*
**
λα
λλ
α +−+
+++ >
r
rr , it is easy to show that: 
    idII
~ˆ < .               (27) 
According to (27), the level of investment idI
~
corresponding to the crossing point of these two 
curves is not a steady state equilibrium. 
Taking account of above discussion, the curves 
inv
D  and  
ee
D  could be represented as in 
Fig. 2. At high levels of I, the leverage constraint (4) will not bind. Instead, investment is 
determined by equations (5) and (11) and consequently limited to Iˆ . According to conditions 
                                                 
5 We have 0=−
eeinv
DD  if αμααμα μμαλαλλ −+ −−−−−+−+=++ })1()]1)(1(1[{)1]()1(1[)1( 1** IIXIrIXr . 
The left hand of the last equation is a line with constant positive slope and the right hand denoted by )(IΦ  is a 
curve with positive slope: 0})1()]1)(1(1[{)1]()1(1)[1( 11*' >−−−−−+−+−=Φ −+− αμααμα μμαλαμα IIXIr  with  
∞→Φ
→
'
0
lim
I
, 0})1()]1)(1(1[{)1]()1(1)[1](1)1([ 12*" <−−−−−+−+−−−=Φ −+− αμααμα μμαλαμμαα IIXIr . That 
shows that there is a second solution for I  denoted by idI
~  with 0~ >idI .  
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(18) and (27), the set of feasible combinations of debt and investment is constituted of AB 
(i.e., II ˆ= ) and OB (i.e., the dark part on the curve 
inv
D ). For II ˆ< , it is optimal for risk-
neutral entrepreneurs to use fully the leverage effect since this is the most rapid path of wealth 
accumulation. When Iˆ  is attained, entrepreneurs will reduce the leverage to a level smaller 
than )1( λ+ .  
   I                          
  I
~
    
  dI          invD  
                              
                         idI
~
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                              Fig. 2:  Steady state equilibria. 
The position of the curves 
inv
D  and 
ee
D depends on the value of X, *r  μ , v  and α . 
Whereas λ  is a determinant of 
inv
D , it does not affect 
ee
D . These two curves rotate counter-
clockwise around O, if:   
- X decreases, implying a depreciation of the real exchange rate. That will increase the 
value of foreign currency debt when measured in domestic currency.6 
- *r  rises, increasing financial burden of foreign debt.  
- μ  increases, leading to similar effect as a decrease in X.  
                                                 
6  Denote 0)1()]1)(1(1[ >−−−−−=Π II μμαα , deriving invD  and eeD  given by equations (22)-(23) with respect 
to X yields:  0
)1()()1(
])1()1[(])1([
*2
12 >= +Π++
−Π++Π+Π+
∂
∂ −−+
rvX
IXIvXI
X
D inv
λ
λααμλμα αμαμααμαμα , 0>∀ invD  ; and 
*2
1
}{
])1[(
rvX
IXIvXI
X
D ee
Π+
−Π+Π+Π
∂
∂ −−+= αμαμααμαμα αμαμ , 0>∀ eeD .  
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The above-mentioned changes in exogenous variables and parameters imply that the 
entrepreneurs’ wealth and the trade account surplus are reduced to levels that can only sustain 
a lower foreign debt if both leverage and external solvency constraints are respected. 
An increase in v  also induces a counter-clock rotation of these curves around O. 
However, it exercises its effects in a different manner. In effect, it is equivalent to an increase 
of total foreign debt. To keep foreign debt at a constant level compatible with the leverage and 
external solvency constraints, domestic currency debt must be reduced. In the case of a 
decrease in λ , it limits the foreign borrowing by entrepreneurs but does not affect the external 
solvency constraint. 
We remark that a variation of α  has contradictory effects on the curves 
inv
D  and 
ee
D . It 
ambiguously affects the entrepreneurs’ wealth and hence the maximal amount of foreign debt 
which can be borrowed by them. It similarly affects the trade account and therefore the level 
of foreign debt sustainable by the trade surplus.7 On the one hand, an increase in α  will raise 
the total revenue that can be distributed (due to positive effect on the production) and the part 
of national revenue distributed to entrepreneurs. This increases the surplus of entrepreneurs’ 
revenue over investment and thus their capability to repay principal and interests on foreign 
debt. In other words, it decreases workers’ consumption and importations and increases the 
trade surplus necessary to pay interests on foreign debt. On the other hand, an increase in α  
implies a depreciation of the real exchange rate due to a higher productivity of existing capital 
and hence a larger output as well as larger part of output that can be exported. After the 
depreciation, the value of foreign currency debt increases in terms of domestic currency. 
                                                 
7  Deriving invD and eeD given respectively by equations (22) and (23) with respect to α  leads to:  { }
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these two derivatives has some positive terms and some negative terms, the net effect is ambiguous. 
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Hence, total foreign debt becomes too high and must be reduced to respect both leverage and 
external solvency constraints.  
The foreign debt is non negative, i.e. 0≥+ FpD , I∀ . This condition translates the 
assumptions given before, i.e. entrepreneurs have objective of attaining wealthy statute in 
exploiting as quick as possible all domestic investment opportunities; and once this statute is 
obtained, they will not seek to increase further their wealth by spending the surplus of their 
revenue over the investment. Under the above condition, there are only two stationary 
equilibria (Fig. 2). One corresponds to the point O, where investment and foreign debt are 
both zero. At this equilibrium, lenders do not believe that entrepreneurs have any collateral. 
Another equilibrium is the point A where foreign debt is zero and investment equals Iˆ .  
 
4. Dynamics and mechanism of financial crisis 
 
In a static analysis, Krugman has shown that there are three equilibria where investment 
equals financeable investment that depends on wealth and leveraged financing. The worst 
equilibrium is the one with zero investment. According to Krugman, a financial crisis happens 
due to the interaction between borrowing, real exchange rate and wealth. The total amount 
that entrepreneurs can borrow from foreign lenders depends on their wealth. The wealth of 
each individual entrepreneur depends on the total amount of such borrowing. The borrowing 
of individual entrepreneur has a negative externality on the community, since the volume of 
capital inflow affects the terms of trade and hence the valuation of foreign-currency-
denominated debt. Due to this externality, a decline in capital inflows can adversely affect the 
balance sheets of domestic entrepreneurs, reducing their ability to borrow and hence further 
reducing capital inflows.  
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Sharing the basic story with Krugman, we remark that the three equilibria do not find their 
equivalent in a dynamic analysis. Analysing the steady state of the economy reveals that there 
are only two equilibria.  
The phase diagram represented in Fig. 3 allows discussing the dynamic stability of the 
economy. At the right of the curve 
ee
D , the external debt is too high in the sense that the 
trade surplus is not sufficient to pay interests on existing foreign debt and the latter keeps 
increasing due to current account deficit, and vice versa. Under the line Iˆ  and at the left of 
the curve 
inv
D , as the foreign debt is smaller than the maximum authorised by international 
lenders, entrepreneurs’ wealth increases and they can invest more and more. Above the line Iˆ  
the investment is too high and it has a rate of return smaller than that offered by international 
financial market. Consequently, investment must be reduced to increase the marginal rate of 
return of capital. Under the line Iˆ  and at the right of the curve 
inv
D , the foreign debt is too 
high to satisfy the leverage constraint and the entrepreneurs’ wealth will be insufficient to 
sustain the past level of investment. Therefore, investment must be reduced. 
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  Fig. 3:  Multiple equilibria and phase diagram. 
The equilibrium point A is stable. Meanwhile, the equilibrium point O is not stable since a 
small wealth is sufficient to start a wealth accumulation process which leads to higher and 
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higher investment and foreign debt, leading the domestic economy finally to the equilibrium 
point A. A more detailed discussion, in distinguishing seven areas in Fig. 3, allows us to 
understand better the underlying dynamics of investment and foreign debt.  
In area 1 (area ABO), bounded at the above by the line Iˆ  and at the right by 
inv
D , the 
foreign debt is smaller than the limit fixed by leverage constraint and is compatible with 
external solvency constraint. In this area, risk neutral entrepreneurs tend to invest in using at 
maximum the leveraged financing so that they can enrich themselves as quickly as possible, 
i.e. along the segment OB of the curve 
inv
D . They have the possibility to progressively 
reduce their foreign debt and invest with their own financial resources once Iˆ  is attained. 
While the path OB is realisable, it is extremely fragile and can lead to financial crisis when 
the domestic economy is facing adverse external shocks or international lenders turn 
pessimistic about the perspectives of the domestic economy. Entrepreneurs with risk aversion 
will choose a wealth-accumulation path in the interior of the area ABO.  
In area 2, delimited by the line Iˆ , the curve 
ee
D  and the curve OB, the debt is higher 
than the limit fixed by the leverage constraint but is compatible with the external solvency 
constraint. If the combination of investment and foreign debt happens to be in this area, 
entrepreneurs are constrained to reduce investment in order to reduce foreign debt. The 
temporary equilibrium that will realise after adjustment of international lending can be more 
or less favourable, depending on the confidence of international lenders placed on these 
entrepreneurs and the perspectives of the domestic economy. For a level of wealth 0W , 
instead of reducing their lending to a level corresponding to a point such as C, international 
lenders with herd behaviour could reduce their lending to zero, diminishing hence the 
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investment to a level equal to 0W .
8 A jump from a point of disequilibrium with high foreign 
debt to a temporary equilibrium without it becomes probable when the debt is short run.  
In area 3, which is at the right of the curve 
ee
D  and under the line Iˆ , entrepreneurs have 
high foreign debt, exceeding the limit imposed by the leverage constraint and that by external 
solvency constraint. If the foreign debt is not too high, a quick reaction of international 
lenders will allow them to recover totally or most of their lending. If they wait, the situation 
could deteriorate and lead to a loss for lenders while all entrepreneurs bankrupt. 
In area 4, above the line Iˆ  and bordered at the left by the curve 
inv
D for idII
~>  and the 
curve 
ee
D  for [
~
,ˆ] idIII ∈ , the investment is higher than Iˆ  and the foreign debt is too high to 
be compatible with both leverage and external solvency constraints. Rational entrepreneurs 
will reduce their investment until Iˆ . The reaction of international lenders will depend on the 
initial level of foreign debt as well as that of wealth.  
In area 5, between curves 
inv
D  and 
ee
D  with [
~
,ˆ] idIII ∈ , the investment is higher than Iˆ . 
The foreign debt, while being compatible with the external solvency constraint, is too high to 
be compatible with the leverage constraint. Entrepreneurs will have to reduce their investment 
until Iˆ . If they do not make this decision, they will be constrained by foreign lenders to 
reduce their investment after all. Since foreign debt is not excessively high and entrepreneurs’ 
wealth is large, a severe financial crisis is impossible.  
In area 6, between curves 
inv
D  and 
ee
D  with idII
~> , the investment is higher than Iˆ  
and the foreign debt, while being compatible with the leverage constraint, is too high for the 
long term external solvency constraint to be respected. Entrepreneurs must reduce their 
                                                 
8 To the difference of the figure given in Krugman (1999), not all firms will bankrupt and investment will not 
finally fall to zero in this dynamic analysis. 
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investment until Iˆ  and their foreign debt correspondingly. On the contrary, the foreign debt 
will increase due to unpaid interests and that will not be allowed by rational and well-
informed international lenders, who would consider that the increasing current account deficit 
is not sustainable.  
In area 7, delimited at the above by the curve 
ee
D , [,
~
] did III ∈∀  and at the right by the 
curve 
inv
D  with [
~
,ˆ] idIII ∈ , the investment is higher than Iˆ . The foreign debt is compatible 
with both constraints. Entrepreneurs will reduce investment and foreign debt until the point A 
is attained. 
In the areas 1 and 7, the behaviour of this model is relatively uninteresting in terms of 
crisis probability. In the area 1, the economy has a high rate of return on investment and the 
accumulation of capital stock is delayed by not making leverage constraint binding. In the 
area 7, reducing orderly both investment and foreign debt is optimal and feasible. An outburst 
of severe financial crisis is improbable since the wealth is sufficiently high with regard to 
existing foreign debt. In these two areas, there will be nothing that resembles an Asian-style 
financial crisis as discussed in the literature.  
The financial crises in this dynamic setting are not explained by jumps between the 
multiple stationary equilibria due to self-fulfilling expectations. In contrast, they can be 
reinterpreted as jumps from a temporary equilibrium with high foreign debt to another one 
with less or no foreign debt, situated on two distinct dynamic trajectories. For a financial 
crisis to take place, it is necessary to consider some factors that make foreign lenders 
panicking. For example, two channels of contagion, i.e. monsoonal effects and spill-over 
effects (Masson, 1999), can be used here to explain a financial crisis. The monsoonal effects 
emanate from the global environment (in particular, from policies in industrial countries), and 
sweep over all emerging countries to a greater or lesser extent. Thus, a monetary contraction 
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in the world leading country could considerably raise the financial costs of investment for an 
indefinite horizon and hence put some emerging market economies under great financial 
pressures. Due to spill-over effects, crisis in one country may affect other emerging markets 
through the linkages operating through trade, economic activities or competitiveness. A 
typical example is a currency devaluation of a rival country in crisis, which reduces 
potentially the exportations of the domestic economy. 
Due to the effects of contagion, an economy initially on a feasible accumulation path such 
as OB in Fig. 3 could be found to be situated at the right of 
inv
D  or in the worst case at the 
right of 
ee
D  as these curves rotate counter-clockwise. For emerging market economies that 
initially offer high rate of return of capital, this situation could result from previous choices of 
entrepreneurs who underestimate the effects of exogenous shocks on macroeconomic and 
financial stability and the repercussion of these shocks on the rate of return of their 
investment.  
We remark that although the leveraged financing is assumed to have a rigid multiplier λ , 
international lenders can choose to reduce drastically the debt to a level that they consider as 
safe for their principal and interest payments. This is more likely if the debt is short-run. 
Under a flexible exchange regime, a severe reduction of investment and foreign debt in a 
short time can take place when some shocks modify drastically and adversely the current and 
future real exchange rates and hence reduce entrepreneurs’ wealth to a dangerous low level. 
Any temporary equilibrium along the line OB is submitted to the possibility that a loss of 
lenders’ confidence will be validated by financial collapse if these lenders change radically 
their behaviour. In normal time, domestic entrepreneurs could finance their investment in 
using at maximum the leveraged financing. But in bad time, panicking international lenders 
could reduce arbitrarily the leverage multiplier to a level that they consider as safe. They 
would examine attentively if the exogenous shocks are sufficiently important so that the 
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economy is going to collapse with investment and entrepreneurs’ wealth falling to zero. This 
scenario is possible only if investment and foreign debt are both jumping variables. If the 
investment is only amortised partially in every period and the foreign debt is long term, the 
immediate collapse will be less severe and these two variables will be on a path corresponding 
to a rampant crisis, less violent than the one with sudden withdrawal of foreign lending. 
Even though the basic part of this model is the same as Krugman, the story talked here is 
somewhat different from his one. In fact, Krugman worked with three equilibria that are made 
possible by using a static analysis. A financial crisis corresponds then to a jump from the 
equilibrium with high investment to the one with zero investment with all entrepreneurs 
bankrupt, given that the intermediate equilibrium is unstable. By analysing the dynamics of 
the model, we have shown that that there are only two steady state equilibria. A financial 
crisis is then a dynamic phenomenon of an emerging market economy that uses extensively 
foreign debt (foreign currency denominated or not) to finance its development. It is a jump 
from one dynamically unstable trajectory of wealth-accumulation to another one with less 
investment and lower foreign debt when international lenders become pessimistic. When 
severe financial crisis takes place, not all entrepreneurs are systematically bankrupt. The 
collapse (or shift from a dynamic trajectory of high debt to another one with low or no debt) 
does not imply that the previous investments were unsound. The problem is instead one of 
financial fragility in a dynamic context. 
 
5.  Factors at the origin of financial fragility and crisis 
 
It is largely documented that Asian countries, which have been drawn into 1997 financial 
crisis, had a balance of payments characterized by large current account deficits compensated 
by net inflow of foreign capital. In the dynamic setting, this could correspond to a situation 
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where ambitious entrepreneurs expand their investment using at maximum the leveraged 
financing along or near the line OB. That implies an increasing inflow of foreign capital. In 
the following, we consider the dynamic framework how different factors could create 
financial fragility and cause a financial crisis.  
 
5.1. Factors at the origin of financial fragility 
The financial fragility in this model has nothing to do with the mismatch between short-term 
debt and long-term investments; nor does it appear to depend on foreign exchange reserves. 
Krugman has highlighted the difference between his story of financial fragility and that told 
by others (e.g. Chang and Velasco, 2001) by considering the conditions under which this 
fragility can occur — namely, when financeable investment responds more than one to actual 
level of investment. That leads him to consider the following factors as being able to cause 
financial collapse: (i) High leverage; (ii) Low marginal propensity to import; (iii) Large 
foreign-currency debt relative to exports.   
In the dynamic setting, we re-examine below if they make the domestic economy more 
fragile and more likely to fall into financial crisis in the event of adverse exogenous shocks or 
unfavourable change in international lenders’ opinion.  
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                          Fig. 4:  High leverage and steady state equilibrium. 
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High leverage   
An increase in the leverage, i.e. a higher λ , will induce the curve 
inv
D  to rotate clockwise 
without modifying the position of the curve 
ee
D . Whatever is the value of λ , 
inv
D  is always 
at the left of 
ee
D , II ˆ<∀ . A temporary equilibrium like B’ in Fig. 4 is less susceptible of 
keeping the confidence of international lenders than a point like B. In effect, if  shocks come 
to induce 
ee
D  to rotate counter-clockwise, it is more probable to find the point B’ at the right 
of the new curve (not drawn in Fig. 4) representing the external equilibrium condition. That 
corresponds to a situation where the external debt is not sustainable. 
 
Low marginal propensity to import 
A decrease in marginal propensity to import will induce the curves 
inv
D  and 
ee
D  to rotate 
clockwise with the later being more sensible. Since a low marginal propensity to import leads 
domestic entrepreneurs to contract higher foreign debt, it will increase the fragility of the 
domestic economy and reduce the latter’s capability of buffering against adverse shocks.  
 
Large foreign-currency debt relative to exports 
The ratio of foreign-currency debt relative to exports is a complex indicator which is not 
clearly discussed by Krugman. A large ratio of foreign-currency debt relative to exports can 
be due to multiple factors. Using equations (12), (19) and (22), the ratio can be written as: 
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An increase in v , μ , λ  as well as an decrease in *r  and X  could lead domestic firms to 
contract a larger foreign currency debt, implying an increase in the ratio X
pF  while an increase 
in α  has ambiguous effect. A larger ratio XpF  will make these firms more vulnerable to 
financial crisis. The ratio X
pF  depends also on the investment and hence the stage of economic 
development. It is to note that some parameters or exogenous variables, such as λ , *r  and 
X , can vary adversely and brutally, leading to financial crisis as discussed in the following.  
 
5.2. Factors at the origin of a financial crisis 
The factors discussed above explain the fragility of emerging market economy using foreign 
currency debt to finance its development. They matter because they make the circular loop 
from past investment to real exchange rate to balance sheets to current investment more 
powerful. But they don’t explain why Asian financial crisis takes place. All afflicted Asian 
economies were peculiarly vulnerable to financial crisis due to high leverage and unusually 
high levels of debt denominated in foreign currency. These borrowings have placed them 
before an increased risk of financial collapse if the real exchange rate depreciated. We show 
that the factors that were present in Asian crisis can also generate a financial crisis under 
floating (or quasi floating) exchange rate regime as is observed in Iceland and Central and 
Eastern European countries.9 Generally, the factors leading to financial fragility can become 
factors at origins of financial crisis if they come to change adversely. Consider here some 
others not considered in the above discussion.  
 
Foreign monetary policy 
                                                 
9 Some Central and Eastern countries are in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II, preparing their entry into the 
European Economic and Monetary Union, which allows their exchange rate between their national currency and 
the euro to fluctuate with a standard fluctuation band of 15% above and below the central exchange rate. 
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One important factor which is present previous to Asian financial crisis is the high 3-month 
Libor interest rate (Kwack, 2000). In effect, previous to the crisis, the Fed has adopted a 
restrictive stance for its monetary policy, inducing hence higher interest on international 
financial markets. This shock can affect considerably the temporary equilibrium based on 
leveraged financing. According to equations (22) and (23), an increase in *r  shifts the line Iˆ  
to 'Iˆ , and induces the curves 
inv
D  and 
ee
D  to rotate counter-clockwise (Fig. 5).  
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                           Fig. 5:  An increase in foreign interest rate. 
An increase in foreign interest rate reduces the foreign funds that can borrow domestic 
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, they have to pay high interest rate, reducing thus their wealth 
from 0W  to 
'
0W . If the net wealth is sufficiently high at the initial temporary equilibrium, the 
following adjustment can place the economy on a trajectory such as the curve OB’. On the 
contrary, the foreign debt can either jump to a low level if it is short term or follow a 
trajectory characterized by long-lasting financial crisis if it is long term. 
 
Lender’s attitudes towards domestic entrepreneurs 
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In the present model, the leverage of investment over entrepreneurs’ wealth is considered as 
fixed. When a financial crisis hits other emerging market economies, lenders may change 
their mind and hence reduce the leverage multiplier. In this case, the curve 
inv
D  rotates 
counter-clockwise, while the curves 
ee
D  and iso-wealth stays unaffected.  
A reduction in the leverage multiplier may translate an increased risk aversion or loss of 
confidence of international lenders on the future perspective of the domestic economy or/and 
world economy. It is not sufficient to lead to the occurrence of a financial crisis except when 
their pessimistic expectations are realised. If entrepreneurs’ wealth is not influenced, 
investment and foreign debt will adjust orderly towards lower levels. 
 
Contagious financial crisis 
A currency devaluation of a neighbour country that is competitor of the domestic county on 
the international goods market reduces the latter’s exportations.10 That induces the curves 
inv
D   and  
ee
D  to rotate counter-clockwise and could make the initial temporary equilibrium 
with high investment and high foreign debt unsustainable judging by the leverage constraint 
and/or external equilibrium condition. If the leverage constraint is not respected meanwhile 
external solvency constraint is respected, the panic of lenders might not be very severe since 
the reduction of liquidity in the domestic economy will not bankrupt all entrepreneurs. In 
effect, a reduction of exportations will impact negatively the entrepreneurs’ wealth since it 
implies a depreciation of the real exchange rate and hence increases the value of foreign 
currency debt measured in domestic currency. A surprise decrease in exportations would 
make some domestic entrepreneurs insolvent and could lead to a financial crisis. The severity 
                                                 
10 We neglect the effect of neighbour country’s currency devaluation on the domestic price level. This can be 
justified by assuming that the domestic country produces similar goods as its neighbour but does not import 
goods from its neighbour for consumption or investment. 
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of the crisis depends on initial wealth, leverage multiplier as well as amplitude of the fall in 
exportations. 
However, if the external solvency constraint is also violated, a deep crisis could easily 
materialize since the high level of debt would be backed by an insufficient level of wealth or 
even negative wealth. Thus, the liquidation of all firms might not leave enough financial 
resources to pay all foreign debt and interests.  
 
6. Policy analysis  
 
The dynamic setting can be easily used to analyze three policy issues considered by Krugman 
(1999). Since the framework is formulated in non-monetary terms, it is more adapted for 
analysing the situation of an emerging market economy under floating exchange rate regime. 
This is to some extent the case in Central and Eastern European countries and Iceland. 
Therefore, we do not consider explicitly the exchange rate peg in the following. Nevertheless, 
an exchange rate peg can be mimicked by a real exchange rate peg.  
 
Preventive measures against financial crisis 
Krugman has argued that the widespread imposition of Chilean-type restrictions on short-term 
borrowing denominated in foreign currencies, which reduces short-term foreign-currency 
exposure, could not allow emerging market countries to reduce significantly the risks of being 
forced into crisis by a loss of confidence. In addition, as long as a country has free 
convertibility of capital, short-term foreign loans are only one of many different possible 
sources of capital flight. Our dynamic analysis gives a more nuanced analysis by allowing the 
case where only a small part of foreign loans is short term, foreign debt will not be a totally 
free jumping variable and will not fall to zero whenever there is a financial crisis.  
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Consider a contagious financial crisis in a competing country, which decreases the 
expected exportations of the domestic country in the future. The curves 
inv
D  and 
ee
D  rotate 
counter-clockwise (the curves representing 
ee
D  and '
ee
D  are not given in Fig. 6 for 
simplicity). Such event reduces the sustainable level of foreign loans and makes the iso-
wealth curve rotate counter-clockwise around the point C, a temporary equilibrium point 
attained before the financial crisis but not anymore sustainable. If short-term foreign debt is 
sufficiently important, the economy will jump along the new iso-wealth curve to the point C’, 
the crossing point between the Iso-wealth bis and the curve 
'
inv
D ,  or to another one down the 
curve Iso-wealth bis and at the left of the curve 
'
inv
D . Then, the economy follows a trajectory 
along 
'
inv
D  or another trajectory with less leverage leading again to higher investment and 
higher foreign debt in the future when the dust of financial panic has settled.  
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               Fig. 6: The effect of contagious crisis with mixture of short and long term debt.  
A high level of long-term foreign debt implies that the economy is on a trajectory of less 
violent but long-lasting financial crisis if a temporary equilibrium happens to be at the right of 
the curve 
'
inv
D . The fact that the holders of short-term foreign debt will refuse to roll it over 
could generate an exchange rate depreciation that bankrupts some entrepreneurs until the 
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foreign debt is sufficiently low (i.e. at left of the curve 
'
inv
D ). However, higher rate of return 
of capital will allow entrepreneurs who have survived the crisis to regain the confidence of 
international lenders.  
The nuance that we introduce in the analysis of the impact of the financial crisis does not 
put into question Krugman’s proposition about the appropriate prophylactic policy; i.e., to 
avoid any transmission of international crisis to the domestic economy, it is necessary to 
discourage firms from taking on foreign-currency-denominated debt of any maturity. In 
effect, the real-exchange-rate impact of adverse shocks could negatively affect domestic 
investment in the presence of such borrowing. The negative effects are magnified to cause 
economic distress when such borrowing is high and when capital-market imperfections are 
important. In the absence of foreign currency debt (i.e. 0=v ), a shock like a decrease of 
exportations will not modify 
inv
D  as well as 
ee
D  according to equations (27) and (28), but 
can impact negatively the wealth of the current period according to equation (8). If the shock 
is small, the current level of entrepreneurs’ wealth can stay above that of last period allowing 
international lenders to maintain the same level of lending for the following periods. On the 
contrary, these lenders will reduce the lending to a level compatible with lower level of 
wealth. The adjustment could then be realised downside along the curve 
inv
D . However, 
extreme shocks, such as a sudden decrease of exportations inducing an ample depreciation of 
the real exchange rate and a brutal decrease in output,11 and hence a severe reduction of 
entrepreneurs’ wealth, can lead to a financial panic. 
In this framework, we can consider another measure to avoid the contagion by 
international financial crises, i.e., the government limits the leveraged financing used by 
domestic entrepreneurs. Limiting the use of leveraged financing to a level (on a path at the left 
                                                 
11 The current stock of capital depends negatively on current real exchange rate. 
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of OB in Fig. 6) less than the leverage multiplier allowed initially by international lenders will 
decrease the probability that these entrepreneurs become insolvent in the event of adverse 
shocks.  
 
Policy during the financial crisis  
In the period before 1997, Asian countries have grown rapidly and liberalised their capital 
account as urged by the FMI while keeping nominal exchange rate peg. The peg of Asian 
monies to US dollar is an important characteristic of these countries. To avoid the risks of 
financial trauma due to foreign currency debt was a major reason why the IMF advised its 
Asian client countries to follow the much-criticized “IMF strategy” which consists to defend 
their currencies with high interest rates rather than simply letting they devaluate. Even though 
this model does not allow a direct analysis of monetary policy, we can get some insight at the 
nature and consequences of the IMF strategy by imagining that the effect of that strategy is to 
hold the real exchange rate p constant even when the willingness of international lenders to 
finance investment declines. Stabilizing the nominal and real exchange rates, while closing 
one channel for potential financial collapse, opens another: according to equation (8), 
increasing strongly domestic interest rate hence the interest rate paid to international lenders 
implies that the sustainable level of foreign debt is reduced drastically, especially when 
leverage is high.12  
Following Krugman, the provision of emergency lines of credit must not be used to avoid 
the currency crisis, i.e. defending the un-defendable nominal exchange rate peg, but to prevent 
the financial crisis that could result from it due to high level of foreign currency debt. These 
                                                 
12 In the case of Thailand, given the overvaluation, Merton (1998) considers that one mistake of the government 
is not to take a once-and-for-all devaluation. Another mistake is to raise local interest rate since the interest rate 
parity theorem tells us that those speculators who have already sold short baht in the forward market will be 
enriched, not hurt. On the contrary, it can hurt entrepreneurs and hence precipitate a financial crisis.  
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credit lines would have to do more than just provide balance-of-payments financing or even 
provide lender-of-last resort facilities to banks.  
Assume as before that the domestic economy is submitted to a contagious crisis and the 
curves 
inv
D  and 
ee
D  rotate counter-clockwise (the representation of 
ee
D  is omitted in Fig. 7 
for simplicity). The above measure is justified if the level of investment before the crisis is 
less than Iˆ . However, due to changing international context, the foreign debt could become 
too high to respect the leverage constraint but is always compatible with external solvency 
constraint (point C in Fig. 7).   
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Fig. 7: The effect of contagious crisis and the IMF credit lines. 
Keeping the temporary equilibrium at the point C, while the anticipated depreciation of 
domestic currency (and hence that of the real exchange rate) indicates a possible temporary 
equilibrium at the left of the curve 
'
inv
D , can consume much financial resources. To keep the 
level of investment corresponding to the point C, the IMF’s financial aid must be enough to 
make up the credit being lost by firms so as to allow investment to continue, given that some 
foreign lenders will reduce their lending. If the IMF funds are used to defend the nominal 
exchange rate peg, the aid must be large enough to substitute all private foreign lending 
desiring quitting the country at the official nominal exchange rate.  
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If the IMF credit lines are not used to defend the nominal exchange rate peg, a temporary 
equilibrium like the point C is defendable. In the case where the domestic currency is already 
depreciated, there is less or no incentive for capital flight, particularly when the IMF financial 
aid can be used, through a mechanism that funnels the funds to troubled entrepreneurs, to 
limit the bankruptcy due to lack of liquidity.13 If the IMF is willing to help the country in 
crisis but without excess investment, a sufficiently large credit line would never actually have 
to be used, since its very existence would prevent the financial crisis from ever getting under 
way. Standstill agreements on foreign-currency debt negotiated with foreign lenders can 
greatly increase the efficacy of the IMF aid. Nevertheless, the currency crisis is not easily 
avoidable if the capital convertibility is always in place. In Fig. 7, the economy can pass from 
point C to point E when entrepreneurs reduce progressively their debt owed to the IMF. 
Another measure to rule out the possibility of a downward financial spiral, which has been 
used by Malaysia during the 1997 crisis, is to impose a curfew on capital flight. In the Fig. 7, 
it consists to keep the economy at the point C by keeping unchanged the real exchange rate 
and by not letting the foreign lenders reducing their lending. It can be justified by the fact that 
standstill agreements on foreign-currency debt are not sufficient to avoid the twin crises. This 
measure allows avoiding the exchange rate and financial crises if capital-account 
convertibility is suspended so that any form of capital flight is not anymore possible. This 
measure is efficient only when the shock at the origin of these crises is transitory and the 
domestic investment is not too high compared with the level which is rational to realize when 
international economic and financial environment becomes normal. It is then even in the self-
interest of investors to impose emergency capital controls since not all investors can escape 
from the twin crises undamaged. However, if the adverse shocks are permanent, capital will 
                                                 
13 Generally, it is political difficult to justify the rescue of these entrepreneurs who are considered as culpable on 
the ground that their excesses brought on the crisis in the first place. 
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find progressively other ways to quit the country and the curfew on capital flight will loss its 
efficacy.  
 
Rebuilding the economy after the financial crisis 
Considering the bad equilibrium with zero investment, Krugman suggested that the main 
problem was that the entrepreneurs who drove investment and growth before the crisis are 
now effectively bankrupt and unable to raise capital.  
In the dynamic analysis, the situation depends on the initial levels of wealth and foreign 
currency debt of every individual entrepreneur. If the aggregate wealth of entrepreneurs after 
the devaluation of the domestic currency is high and little affected by the twin crises, many 
entrepreneurs can survive and reimburse their foreign debt and continue to develop in a 
context with less competition and higher profitability since the investment level is lower. 
Then, this will create a new wave of development soon after the twin crises. In this case, the 
efforts focused on bank restructuring and recapitalization are sufficient.  
Consider a second case where the aggregate wealth after the devaluation is near zero or 
negative, only some prudent entrepreneurs can survive and reimburse their foreign debt and 
develop more quickly with high profitability and weak competition since a majority of 
entrepreneurs have bankrupted. Even if a big wave of development can happen soon after the 
twin crises, the short-run deep economic recession is however too costly. Consequently, the 
efforts focused on bank restructuring and recapitalization are not sufficient. Solutions 
proposed by Krugman, such as rescuing bankrupt entrepreneurs through some kind of “private 
sector Brady Plan”, and/or growing a new set of entrepreneurs and/or welcoming foreign 
direct investment, are needed to reduce the economic and social consequences of the twin 
crises and to allow an accelerating recovery of the domestic economy.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the dynamic implications of the Krugman’s (1999) model with balance 
sheet effects by extending it to explicitly take account of wealth accumulation constraint and 
external equilibrium condition. The revisit to Krugman’s analysis is interesting since it has a 
considerable impact on the literature of international financial crisis, it is largely used in the 
teaching of open-economy macroeconomics across the world, and it is still applicable to 
actual financial crisis affecting some Central and Eastern European countries and Iceland.    
Basically, our analysis complements these of Krugman by extending his analysis to a 
dynamic framework, which allows better illustrating his comments about different factors at 
the origin of financial fragility and financial crisis in emerging market economies. The present 
analysis does support most of the discussions intuitively made by Krugman on the policy 
implications of his model while suggesting some nuanced analysis of crisis scenarios and 
policy implications thanks to the dynamic framework.  
The static analysis of such a model implies the existence of three equilibria. Thus, a 
financial crisis corresponds to a jump from the equilibrium with high investment to the one 
with zero investment with all entrepreneurs bankrupt, given that the intermediate equilibrium 
is unstable. By analysing the dynamics of the model, this study shows that there are only two 
steady state equilibria. As a dynamic phenomenon of an emerging market economy that uses 
extensively foreign currency denominated debt to finance its development, a financial crisis 
can be analysed as a jump from one trajectory of wealth-accumulation with higher foreign 
currency debt to another one with less investment and lower foreign currency debt when 
international lenders become pessimistic.  
The dynamic setting provides better illustration of the dynamics inherent to the 
Krugman’s model. In the initial graphic illustration of the analysis made by Krugman, an 
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crisis will lead to the bad equilibrium with zero investment and zero foreign debt. By 
introducing wealth accumulation constraint and external equilibrium condition beside the 
leverage constraint, it is shown in this paper how external shocks can dynamically impact the 
domestic economy and in which cases, these shocks can generate a financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the dynamic analysis allows discriminating the case where an economy could 
collapse to the equilibrium with zero investment and the cases where it returns to a temporary 
equilibrium with low investment. Hence, the severity of financial and currency crises and 
their economic consequences would vary with the level of wealth. Even in the event of severe 
financial crisis, not all entrepreneurs are systematically bankrupt. Therefore, the equilibrium 
with zero investment is not dynamically stable in the sense that a very small amount of capital 
owned by the surviving entrepreneurs could jump-start a wealth-accumulation process after 
the financial crisis.  
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